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Abstract 
This paper extends and applies principal-agent theory to the performance of donor projects. There is 
variation in the degree of divergence between the interests of the donor (the principal) and the 
recipient government (the agent). Further, the effort expended on observation of the agent is a control 
variable. We show that in a wide range of circumstances an implication of principal-agent theory is 
that the principal should put greater effort into observation the wider is the divergence of interest 
with the agent. We then test this prediction using data on World Bank project performance. We 
measure the degree of divergence between donor and recipient interests, as perceived by the donor, 
through a donor classification system of recipient governments. Consistent with the theory, we find 
that donor supervision of projects is significantly more effective in improving project performance 
where interests are widely divergent. However, donors do not put more effort into the supervision of 
projects in such cases. 
 
Key words:  Principal-Agent theory, Aid projects, Supervision, Difficult partnerships 
Résumé 
Cet article étend et applique la théorie Principal-Agent à la performance des projets d’aide. Les 
intérêts du donneur (le principal) et du gouvernement receveur (l’agent) peuvent différer de manière 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. 
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importante. Dans le modèle, l’effort mis en œuvre pour observer l’agent est une variable de contrôle. 
Nous montrons qu’une implication du modèle principal-agent est que le principal devrait faire 
d’autant plus d’effort pour observer l’agent quand ses intérêts divergent de ceux de l’agent. Nous 
testons ensuite ces prédictions en utilisant les données de performance des projets d’aide de la 
Banque mondiale. Nous mesurons le degré de divergence entre les intérêts du donneur et du 
receveur, telle que perçue par le donneur, par la classification des receveurs comme ‘partenariats 
difficiles’. Comme prédit par le modèle, nous trouvons que la supervision des projets d’aide par le 
donneur permet d’autant plus d’assurer le succès des projets que les intérêts du donneur et du 
receveur diffèrent. Toutefois, le donneur ne semble pas faire plus d’effort de supervision dans les 
partenariats difficiles.  
Mots Clés : Théorie Principal-Agent, Projets d’aide, Supervision, Partenariats Difficiles. 
JEL Code :  D86 - F35 - O19 - O22 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In many situations a principal must contract business with a range of agents whose 
interests are known to diverge to varying degrees from those of the principal. We analyze 
whether the principal should set her level of effort expended on supervision of the agent 
purposively so as to compensate for such differences in intrinsic motivation. We consider 
one particularly clear such situation, namely that in which a donor agency is required to 
finance development projects globally which are then implemented by recipient 
governments. The degree to which the interests of donor agencies and recipient governments 
are congruent varies radically between countries. The ideal situation is recognized to be one 
in which interests are coincident: the official language now used by donors to describe this is 
‘partnership’. While coincidence of interests is probably rare, in some situations it is 
manifestly unrealistic. Donor agencies, working together in the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD, have classified their dealings with a group of recipient 
governments as ‘Difficult Partnerships’. These are, by definition, situations in which the 
donor (the principal) perceives an unusually wide divergence of interests between itself and 
the recipient government (the agent). 
The principal-agent problem arises from the conjunction of non-congruent interests with 
the limited observability of agent effort. However, in most situations the degree of 
observability is not a given but is to an extent under the control of the principal. Since 
enhanced observation is costly, the principal must decide how much to spend on it for each 
agent. This is indeed the case in the context of a donor-financed project implemented by a 
recipient government. Donors supervise projects during implementation, and the degree of 
effort put into supervision is an important allocative decision for the managers of donor 
agencies.  
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This paper investigates whether expenditure on supervision should be related to prior 
information about the degree of divergence between the interests of the principal and the 
agent. That is, can more precise observation of agent effort offset divergent interests? In 
Section II we develop the theory, based on a simple principal-agent model. We introduce a 
measure for the degree of divergence between the interests of the principal and the agent, 
and a control variable through which the principal can, at a cost, increase the precision of her 
observation of the agent’s effort. We show that under reasonable assumptions precise 
supervision is indeed a substitute for congruence of interests as long as the principal chooses 
optimally among the set of admissible contracts. With optimal choice of contract, incentives 
are higher-powered the better the precision of supervision and lower-powered the more 
congruent the interests of the two parties.  
In Section III we test the model empirically using data on donor projects. The data cover 
all World Bank projects evaluated by its Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) over the years 
1977 to 2002. The IEG rates completed projects by their degree of success, and also 
evaluates the degree of preparation and supervision by the World Bank of the projects. 
Our main question of interest is whether the impact of supervision on project success is 
related to the degree of divergence of interests between the donor and the recipient country. 
The supervision effort put into a project is at the discretion of World Bank Country Directors 
who control operational budgets: in practice, the vagaries of budgeting and management 
produce wide variations in supervision effort. Corresponding to the OECD concept of 
‘Difficult Partnerships’, the World Bank has its own classification of those recipient 
governments with which interests are likely to be most divergent, termed ‘Low-Income 
Countries Under Stress’, or ‘LICUS’ (World Bank, 2002). We thus have information on the 
performance of projects, the supervision effort put into each project, and the degree of 
divergence between the interests of the donor and the recipient government as perceived by 
the donor. This enables us to test both whether supervision is an effective substitute for 
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congruence of interests, and whether allocative decisions on supervision effort are set 
consequentially.  
We find that while projects are considerably more likely to fail in countries where the 
government has widely divergent interests, supervision is differentially effective in 
increasing the probability of success. This is the case whether or not supervision is 
instrumented for in our econometric estimation. Hence, consistent with the theory, 
supervision is an effective substitute for congruent interests. However, while it might be 
expected that managers would allocate more supervision effort into those countries where 
interests are least congruent, in fact we find that they do the opposite. We consider why the 
incentive environment facing managers might generate this apparently perverse outcome. 
A number of studies have used the IEG data to disentangle the respective contributions 
of country and project-level characteristics to project success. For instance, Isham et al. 
(1997) and Isham and Kaufmann (1999) focus on country characteristics such as civil 
liberties and sound macroeconomic policy and show that both positively affect the economic 
rate of return of World Bank projects. Recent work by Dreher et al. (2013) explores country-
level political economy determinants of project success with a focus on the effects of 
politically-motivated aid (e.g. to countries that hold a non-permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank). The authors find no 
evidence of a negative effect of politically-motivated aid on project performance, except 
when recipient countries are economically vulnerable (higher short-term debt). 
Existing work using the IEG data on project preparation and supervision has found 
somewhat conflicting results. Dollar and Svensson (2000) focus on the success of structural 
adjustment programmes, and find that preparation and supervision have no impact on the 
success of reform; instead, success depends mainly on political-economy factors such as 
political instability, ethnic fragmentation, or democracy. However, their results are not 
confirmed by Kilby (2000) who finds that the supervision effort is effective in raising the 
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probability of success of World Bank projects, notably supervision provided at the early 
stage of projects. Kilby (2012) finds that the preparation of projects by the World Bank also 
significantly increases the likelihood of a satisfactory outcome rating. The discrepancy 
between Kilby’s results (which are in agreement with our findings) and those of Dollar and 
Svensson (2000) is likely due to different treatments of the endogeneity of supervision and 
preparation with respect to project outcome.i  Finally, Denizer et al. (2011) examine the 
impact on project performance of various previously unexplored projects characteristics. 
They notably look at the correlation between projects' outcomes and the quality of the task 
manager. The quality of the task manager is proxied for by the average rating of the other 
projects he managed. They find evidence that the quality of the task manager matters a lot 
for project performance, at least as much as the quality of policy.      
  
 
II. A MODEL OF DIVERGENT INTERESTS AND SUPERVISION 
 
II.A. The Set-Up 
 
This section presents a stylized model whose goal it is to provide a theoretical foundation 
for the empirical investigation in the remainder of the paper. The model is adapted from 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994)ii, which is in turn based on Baker (1992). It analyses the 
optimal contract between a risk-neutral principal (the donor, D; “she”) and a risk-neutral 
agent (the recipient, R; “he”). The donor wants to implement a project in the recipient 
country. The outcome y of this project can be either 0 (failure) or 1 (success). The 
probability that it is a success is determined by the recipient’s effort a: .)1Pr( aay   One 
of the basic assumptions of the model is that, due to its complexity, y is not objectively 
measurable and therefore not contractible. It is also impossible to write contracts based on a. 
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There does, however, exist a verifiable performance measure p (for instance based on a 
report by a project supervisor appointed by D) on which contracts can be based; this 
performance measure takes the values 0 or 1, and .)1Pr( aap    is a random variable 
which is only observed by the recipient (before he chooses his effort level); its expected 
value equals 1 and its variance 1   ( 1
var( )
   is the precision of the performance measure; 
it can be seen as measuring the quality of supervision). Thus, the performance measure is on 
average unbiased, but it is nevertheless distortive because it varies, and so does the 
recipient’s effort as a consequence, despite the fact that the link between effort and 
contribution to project outcome is always the same. The fact that  varies around 1 can be 
interpreted in this context as saying that there are projects where high effort increases both y 
and p (  around one), projects where high effort increases y but not p (   small), and 
projects where high effort increases p but not y (  large). The fact that the recipient 
observes   before choosing an effort level reflects the assumption that he observes the way 
in which supervision of the project will take place and therefore knows whether or not a high 
effort will be necessary to ‘please’ the supervisor (i.e. obtain p= 1).  
We now assume that every project has a fixed overall cost of c<1, and that it is financed 
by the donor in two tranches, of sizes (1-b)c and bc, respectively (where b is between 0 and 
1). The payment of the second and final tranche of money, bc, can be made conditional on 
p=1. An implication is that p is the result of some interim evaluation, before the end of the 
project. As the model assumes that p and y are determined simultaneously, this means that 
when the evaluation takes place, it is already determined whether the project is a success or 
not, even though perhaps it cannot yet be observed by D.  
The donor can choose b, the proportion of the money that she wants to be conditional on 
a positive evaluation, and  , the precision of supervision (which comes at a cost).iii The 
timing of the game is as follows: 
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1. D proposes a project contract (b; );  
2. R accepts or rejects; if he accepts, he receives the first tranche of (1-b)c from D; if he 
rejects, receives his reservation payoff of 0; 
3. If he accepts the contract, R observes   and chooses a at personal cost c(a) (both   
and a are unobservable to the donor); 
4. y and p are realized; if p=1, D pays R the second tranche, bc. 
Concerning the components of the recipient’s utility function, we assume that his cost of 
effort is c(a) = 2a . Furthermore, we assume that he receives non-monetary utility of y , 
with  1,0 . This reflects the utility he derives from a successful outcome of the project, 
where   measures the degree to which the interests of D and R are divergent or congruent.iv 
If  =0, the recipient does not care at all about the outcome of the project; he only cares 
about the money he receives (and the effort he needs to exert to obtain it).v If  =1, he cares 
about the outcome to the same degree as the donor. It is assumed that   is common 
knowledge and exogenously given. 
The cost of precision to the donor is denoted by ),,( C  with 0C , 0C and 
.0C  Thus, the marginal cost of precision is (at least weakly) higher in an environment 
with divergent interests.  
 
II.B. Results 
 
D’s objective function is given by: 
  ),;();,();()1(1);,(   CbVCbcacbaEb   
where the last part within the square brackets reflects the idea that the second tranche (of 
size bc) is only paid if p=1, which happens with probability *a . );,(  b  is what the 
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donor maximizes with respect to b and  , taking into account R’s expected reaction to the 
contract. 
The recipient’s utility function (once he has observed  )vi is given by: 
.)1( 2abcacbaU    
All of the following propositions obtained from solving the model are proved in 
Appendix 1a). Starred letters denote optimal values. 
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal size of the second tranche, cb* , decreases in   and increases in 
  (we consider   as given for the moment). ( cb*  increases in  .) 
The trade-off is evident: a higher b provides incentives for R to exert effort (which is 
good for D), but it also has a cost, as the available performance measure is distortive. This 
cost is however lower the higher is precision  , such that a higher b is optimal. Furthermore, 
when interests are more congruent (  high), there is less need for monetary incentives, as   
and b both lead to higher (expected) effort of R. 
For what follows, we denote by );,();( **  bVV   the value of the contract to D for a 
given level of precision   (exclusive of the cost of precision, ),( C ), and by 
);();();( *  CV   the overall objective of the donor. 
 
PROPOSITION 2. );(* V  as well as the expected probability of project success increase in   
and  . The second cross-partial derivatives 
 *2V
and 
 )Pr(2 success
 are negative. 
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The first part of the proposition is unsurprising: both precision of supervision and 
congruence of interests have a positive impact on the probability of project success and on 
the value of the project to the principal if the optimal b is chosen. 
The second part of the proposition displays the central result of this section. The negative 
cross-partials signify that the (marginal) positive effect of increased precision is stronger the 
more divergent the interests of D and R;   and   are substitutes. Hence, we expect that 
increased precision has a stronger impact on the likelihood of project success in ‘difficult 
partnerships’. Importantly, this prediction arises independently of whether the level of 
precision   is chosen optimally; the proposition simply requires that for given precision, the 
size of the second tranche is set optimally (as described in Proposition 1). 
The above proposition does not necessarily imply that the donor should choose higher 
precision when interests are not congruent. As the next proposition shows, whether this is 
the case depends on the shape of the cost-of-precision function:  
PROPOSITION 3. The optimal choice of precision, );(maxarg 

, is (weakly) decreasing in 
  as long as  

 *22 VC
, and increasing in   otherwise. 
Thus, as long as the cross-partial of the cost-of-precision function is not ‘too negative’ (a 
negative cross-partial means that a marginal increase in precision is more expensive the 
more divergent the parties’ interests), we would expect that the donor chooses a higher 
precision level in circumstances where interests are divergent than in circumstances where 
they are congruent. Only if precision were much more costly in ‘difficult partnerships’ might 
it be optimal for D to choose a lower   despite its differential effectiveness.     
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III. AN APPLICATION TO THE PERFORMANCE OF DONOR PROJECTS 
 
III.A. Context and Data 
 
The World Bank is required by its mandate to undertake development projects in a large 
majority of the world’s low-income countries. Only in the most extreme environments such 
as Somalia does it actually suspend its project operations. The World Bank does not itself 
implement projects. Its normal mode of operation can be decomposed into a series of 
discrete phases. In the first phase, preparation, agreement is reached with a recipient 
government on the content and design of the project. Once approved by the Bank’s Board, 
the project then enters the implementation phase. During implementation, which is 
undertaken by the government, the project is financed in tranches released by the World 
Bank. Each tranche requires the authorization of World Bank management and so provides a 
review point. To inform the management review the World Bank undertakes supervision, a 
report being prepared ahead of each tranche release. If the project is judged to be seriously 
off-track it can be aborted or scaled down on the decision of World Bank management. The 
frequency and scale of the tranches is determined during the preparation phase, but since the 
finance is heavily consessional the Bank has effective power of decision. The wider is the 
perceived divergence of interests with the recipient government the more is the project liable 
to be ‘back-loaded’, with less money released in the first unconditional tranche. This accords 
both with the theory of Section II, in which b is varied according to θ, and also with the 
natural risk aversion common to public bureaucracies. The extent of effort put into 
supervision at each stage is a choice of World Bank management: Country Directors are 
assigned overall administrative budgets and can choose how to allocate these across a wide 
range of functions. Once completed or aborted, the project is evaluated. The evaluation is 
completely independent of the department which is responsible for the project. The IEG 
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reports directly to the Board of the World Bank and its staff are not permitted to move to 
positions in other parts of the Bank. IEG evaluates the performance of the project in discrete 
categories: highly successful, successful, partially successful, partially unsuccessful, 
unsuccessful, highly unsuccessful. In practice, the key distinction is between the three 
former categories and the three latter, so that in our empirical analysis we will treat the 
success variable as binary (data and variables are presented in Appendix 2). IEG also 
separately evaluates the supervision effort by the World Bank and the preparation effort by 
the recipient government (highly satisfactory, satisfactory, unsatisfactory, highly 
unsatisfactory).  
Our data from IEG covers more than 2,000 projects in 102 countries and is 
comprehensive for the time period 1977-2002. Of these, almost 400 projects were in 
‘LICUS’ countries, that is in countries which the Bank itself regarded as having 
governments whose interests were particularly divergent from those of the World Bank. The 
LICUS indicator is derived from the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” (CPIA), 
an internal rating of sixteen different aspects of policy by the World Bank. A country is 
assigned LICUS status if the CPIA averaged over the duration of the project is less than 3 
and if the country was classified as low income at least one year during the project. The aim 
of the LICUS definition is to distinguish countries that are failing to provide an adequate 
environment for economic development opportunities. The CPIA intends to assess 
governments’ choices in terms of policy and reforms rather than the mere economic 
performance of developing countries. As such the LICUS dummy is likely to be a close 
approximation to the concept of ‘Difficult Partnership’ and hence to the set of countries 
whose governments at the time of the project were known to have interests that were 
particularly divergent from those of the World Bank.vii   
The LICUS classification used by the World Bank only classifies countries since 2002. 
However, that classification is based on a combination of income and CPIA data and so it is 
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possible to generate an imputed classification of LICUS-type status for all previous years. 
We use these criteria to generate a project-specific dummy variable that reflects whether, at 
the time during which the project was in its implementation phase, the country met the 
criteria for being a LICUS.viii  
Table 1 shows that in LICUS countries, projects tend to be relatively less successful than 
in non-LICUS countries. While only 29% of the projects are failing in non-LICUS countries, 
almost 43% are failing in LICUS countries. Supervision and preparation are slightly worse 
in LICUS than in non-LICUS, something we will discuss in more detail in section III.D. 
below. Finally, Table 1 confirms that LICUS countries are poorer and have a lower CPIA 
than non-LICUS. On the other hand, the average expected duration at the beginning of the 
project and the time spent by the leader in office are not significantly different in the LICUS 
and non-LICUS subsamples.   
[Table 1 here] 
 
III.B. Empirical Specification and Results 
 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, our main estimation equation is a 
probit model of the following form: 
     
  0 0, , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , ,
Pr( 1) ' '
             ( x ) ( x )
j i T i t j i t j i T j i T
i t j i T i t j i T i t j i t
Success X Y Preparation Supervision
LICUS Preparation LICUS Supervision LICUS
   
   
    
       
 
where j denotes projects, i country and T the evaluation date, t0 the date at which the 
project started and t the time during which the project was implemented. 
0,i t
X is a set of 
variables controlling for the initial conditions in country i (income per capita, time the leader 
was in office, and the CPIA), while 
0, ,j i t
Y captures a set of project level characteristics (was 
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the project financed through IDA, was it an investment project, and the expected duration of 
the project at the time it started).  
Our interest is in the interaction of the dummy variable for countries regarded as having 
particularly divergent interests, LICUSi,t, with the measures of supervision and preparation.  
In the first two columns of Table 2 we report the results from probit regressions with 
project success as the dependent variable. As found previously by Isham and Kaufmann 
(1999) and Denizer et al. (2011), the better is policy - measured by the CPIA - the higher is 
the probability that the project will be a success. The level of income also affects the 
probability of success (although less significantly so), with projects working better in higher 
income countries. Both preparation and supervision as assessed by IEG also significantly 
improve the probability of success, consistently with the results of Kilby (2000, 2012).  
We introduce the LICUS dummy variable for divergent interests directly into the probit 
and also interact it with both preparation and with supervision. The direct effect is 
insignificant. This does not imply that divergent interests do not affect performance: since 
both the level of income and the CPIA score are included in the regression, the dummy 
variable which is derived from them adds no information.ix We now consider the interaction 
between divergent interests and donor choices. First, we consider the interaction between 
divergent interests and project preparation. The direct effect of project preparation is 
significant and positive: a better prepared project is more likely to be a success. This is 
unsurprising: the function of project preparation is to improve the technical design of the 
project and thereby raise its rate of return. Now consider how this might interact with 
divergent interests. As the expected rate of return on the project is increased, this should tend 
to widen the performance gap between governments with coincident and divergent interests. 
The government with interests coincident with those of the donor has an enhanced incentive 
to implement the project well if the expected rate of return is higher. In contrast, a 
government with widely divergent interests has no intrinsic interest in the success of the 
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project and so its performance will be unaffected by an increase in the rate of return. Hence, 
we would expect that the interaction between project preparation and the dummy for 
divergent interests would be negative.x 
Now consider the interaction between divergent interests and project supervision. The 
prediction of the theory developed in Section II is that this interaction should be positive. 
Indeed, were the dummy variable fully to capture the cases in which interests were 
divergent, the direct effect of project supervision would become insignificant since with 
coincident interests the donor does not need the information that supervision provides.  
[Table 2 around here] 
These predictions are supported by our results. The interaction of divergent interests and 
project preparation is negative, although insignificant, and that with project supervision is 
positive and significant. Thus, supervision is differentially effective in situations where 
interests are divergent, and conversely, where interests are divergent it is supervision, not 
preparation, that is differentially important.xi  
The magnitude of the probit coefficients in Table 2 is not directly interpretable (e.g. Ai 
and Norton, 2003), so we now consider the economic significance of the detected differential 
effect of supervision in LICUS countries. On average, the predicted probability of project 
success is 0.69. However, when all variables are taken at mean values of LICUS countries, 
the average probability drops down to 0.58. This is the case notably because LICUS 
countries have lower GDP per capita, lower CPIA, a higher expected duration of projects. 
When all variables are taken at the mean values for non-LICUS countries, the average 
predicted probability is equal to 0.77. Now, we vary the level of supervision. For LICUS 
countries, the predicted probability of success with a supervision level of 2 is 0.22, while 
with a supervision level of 3 it is 0.72 (holding all other variables constant at their mean for 
these countries). For non-LICUS countries, the respective predicted probabilities are 0.46 
and 0.82. Increasing the level of supervision from 2 to 3 thus has a 14 percentage point 
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(=(0.72-0.22)-(0.82-0.46)) larger effect on success probability for LICUS countries than for 
non-LICUS countries, which is highly economically significant. 
In Table 2, column 2 we show that the results from this regression are robust to the 
addition of controls for the sector in which the project is undertaken and of interactions 
between the sector and the LICUS dummy, none of which are significant.xii In column 3 we 
run the same estimation using simple OLS, which leads to similar results as in columns 1 
and 2.  
Finally, we look at an alternative measure for the divergence of interests between the 
donor and the recipient. The LICUS dummy we used so far is meant to capture the difficulty 
of donors' intervention when the economic and institutional environment of the receiving 
country is weak. It is based on the CPIA computed by the World Bank which assesses 
governments choices in terms of macro, structural, social policies. As an alternative, we use 
the Public Investment Management Index (PIMI) which was computed for the 2007-2010 
period by Dabla-Norris et al. (2011). The PIMI index aims at measuring the efficiency of the 
public investment process and management. Among its components the one that is pertinent 
for our purposes is APPRAISAL. This is defined as the strategic guidance and project 
appraisal needed to ensure that "investments are chosen based on development policy 
priorities [and that projects] undergo further scrutiny of their financial and economic 
feasibility and sustainability to avoid wasteful "White elephant" projects" (Dabla-Norris et 
al., 2011). In the raw data, APPRAISAL is rated from 0 to 4. We transform it into a dummy 
variable which is equal to one for values below the median of the sample. Thus when the 
dummy is equal to one, the quality of broad strategic guidance and project appraisal is low. 
Unlike the LICUS dummy, APPRAISAL does not vary through time. In column 4 of Table 
2, we replace the LICUS dummy by the APPRAISAL dummy. The results are very similar 
to those of column 2, both in terms of significance and magnitude of the effect.xiii  
Supervision is again a substitute for convergent interests.  
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III.C. Instrumental Variable Specifications 
 
Next, we try to account for the likely endogeneity of Preparation and Supervision. We 
use as instruments some supply-side determinants of the amounts of aid received. We follow 
Tavares (2003) and use as instruments the total amount of aid of the five biggest donors (US, 
Japan, UK, France and Germany) weighted by cultural and geographical proximity to the 
recipient (bilateral distance and dummy variables for same main religion and same official 
language). This gives us three exogenous instruments. The idea of this kind of instruments is 
to use the economic conditions in the donor countries as a source of exogenous variation for 
supervision and preparation, which reflect donors' efforts and involvement in the success of 
aid project.  
We also need to instrument Preparation x LICUS and Supervision x LICUS. To do so,  
we start by running the first-step estimations for Supervision and Preparation and then 
introduce the predicted values in levels and in interaction with the dummy LICUS. To 
account for predicted regressor issues, we bootstrap the standard errors.  
The IV results are shown in Table 3. In columns 1 and 2, we present the first-step 
estimations from which we predict Supervision and Preparation in order to interact them 
with the dummy LICUS.xiv Among the three instruments, only two are individually 
significantly correlated with both Supervision and Preparation.xv The three instruments are 
however jointly significant in both regressions 1 and 2 and the F-statistics for Supervision 
and Preparation are respectively 9.0 and 4.35. Based on the usual rule-of-thumb that the 
first-stage F-statistic should be at least 10, we are thus somewhat confident in our 
instrumentation for Supervision but less so for Preparation. 
[Table 3 around here ] 
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In Columns 3 and 4, Preparation and its interaction with LICUS are not significant, 
either individually or jointly.  Supervision is positive and significant (at p<0.1) in column 3 
only. The interaction term Supervision x LICUS is positive and not significant in both 
columns 3 and 4, but is jointly significant with Supervision (this is shown in the last rows of 
Table 3). In Columns 5 and 6, we drop the interaction term of Preparation with the dummy 
LICUS which was never significant in any of the previous estimations of Tables 2 and 3. In 
both columns, our main coefficient of interest, Supervision x LICUS, is statistically 
significant, with p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively. It bears noting that the magnitude of the 
coefficient is much larger than in the earlier (uninstrumented) regression, suggesting that the 
excludability condition may not be respected and that the IV results should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
Preparation and Supervision are ordinal variables, taking the values one to four. 
Instrumented as they are in Table 3, they are assumed to be continuous, and a possible bias 
can derive from that. Table 4 explores an alternative way of treating the endogeneity of 
Preparation and Supervision through a recursive multivariate probit model.xvi Preparation 
and Supervision are transformed into binary variables (see Appendix 2). When the four 
equations are simultaneously estimated, Supervision and Preparation are significantly 
positive. Supervision x LICUS is also positive and significant at 5%.xvii The last row of Table 
4 suggests that the error terms of the four simultaneously estimated equations are correlated. 
[Table 4 around here] 
Overall, we conclude that while the results from our IV analysis should be interpreted 
with some caution, the results are qualitatively consistent with our main finding from section 
III.B., namely that supervision is more effective in LICUS countries where the interests of 
donors and recipients tend to diverge. 
   
     
20 
III.D. Is Supervision Higher in LICUS Countries? 
 
Since supervision seems to be differentially effective in the context of divergent 
interests, it might be expected that the management of the World Bank would allocate 
resources to supervision accordingly. In fact, this is not the case.  On the contrary, where 
interests are most divergent supervision is significantly lower. Table 5 shows some 
descriptive statistics of the quality of supervision in the context of divergent interests, that is 
in LICUS countries, and in the context of congruent interests. Supervision is less likely to be 
satisfactory in countries where donor-government interests diverge. The proportion of 
projects with unsatisfactory and highly unsatisfactory supervision is significantly higher in 
the context of divergent interests (p-value=0.002). This is confirmed by ordered probit 
estimations of supervision as a function of the LICUS dummy and some project 
characteristics (Table 6). The dummy for divergent interests is significantly negative, 
suggesting that in difficult partnerships the quality of supervision is lower.     
 [Table 5 and Table 6 around here] 
There are various possible explanations for such a pattern of behaviour. It might be the 
case that supervision is more costly in conditions of divergent interests. As discussed in 
Section II, this would produce an offsetting effect such that the efficient response of 
supervision would be a priori ambiguous. However, as noted by Kilby (2000), the pay-off to 
enhanced project success is so large relative to the costs of supervision that this explanation 
seems implausible. Alternatively, the management of the World Bank might themselves not 
face sufficiently strong incentives to achieve project success. Staff performance is assessed 
annually by indicators of performance in that year, most notably the disbursement on loans. 
The World Bank makes an overall commitment to disburse the IDA money that is provided 
to it every three years by its OECD members, and this in turn generates annual disbursement 
targets for the management team in each region. In contrast, because of the long lags 
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between the decision to propose a project to the Board and the eventual performance of the 
project, incentives actually to abort projects are weak. This encourages a ‘culture of 
disbursement’ rather than an emphasis upon project success. Hence, it may be that while 
some individual managers correctly match a high value of b with a high level of supervision, 
overall managers are more concerned to avoid evidence that would indicate that 
disbursements on a project should be suspended.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In many situations the precision with which the principal can observe the behaviour of an 
agent can be increased at a cost. Further, the principal often has prior information concerning 
the degree of divergence of her interests from those of the agent. In this paper we have 
investigated whether the wider the divergence of interests the more should be spent to 
increase the precision of observation. In our model we have shown that conditional upon the 
principal being free to structure the contract so as to discriminate according to prior 
information about the degree of divergence of interests, greater effort to monitor the agent is 
indeed warranted where interests are more divergent. We then apply the model to the 
situation of donor projects that are implemented by a recipient government. Using World 
Bank data on project performance and donor assessments of the degree of congruence of 
donor-government interests, we have found that, consistent with the theory, supervision is 
differentially effective in improving the performance of projects where interests are least 
congruent. However, while this would lead us to expect that the donor would accordingly 
expend greater effort in supervision in situations of widely divergent interests, in fact donors 
do the opposite. This suggests that either there are offsetting costs of supervision, or the 
incentives facing donor management to allocate administrative budgets are not well-aligned 
with the objective of project success.  
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics (sample = 2023 projects, in 102 countries). 
 Non-divergent 
interests 
LICUS = 0 
Divergent 
interests 
LICUS = 1 
All 
Projects characteristics  
Successful projects 1,163 (71%) 224 (57.5%) 1,387 (69%)
Failed projects 470 (29%) 166 (42.5%) 636 (31%)
Satisfactory supervision 1,251 (77%) 275 (70.5%) 1,526 (75%)
Poor supervision 382 (23%) 115 (29.5%) 497 (25%)
Satisfactory preparation 1,291 (79%) 271 (69.5%) 1,562 (77%)
Poor preparation 342 (21%) 119 (30.5%) 461 (23%)
Expected duration of project 5.1 years 5.4 years 5.1 years 
Countries characteristics    
Average income p.c. 1,478 $ 319 $ 1255 $ 
Average duration of the leader 8.8 years 8.7 years 8.8 years 
Average CPIA 3.4 2.6 3.2 
Note: Income per capita, the duration of the leader in office, and the CPIA are measured, for each country, 
at the beginning of the project and then averaged over each sample and sub-sample (LICUS and non-
LICUS). Supervision and preparation are scaled 0-1 for clarity (1-4 scale in Table 2). 
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TABLE 2. Probability of success of projects, benchmark estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: Success = 1 Probit Probit OLS Probit 
Measure of divergence of interests:  LICUS LICUS LICUS APPRAISAL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Preparation 1.008*** 1.013*** 0.252*** 1.071*** 
 (0.0990) (0.105) (0.0248) (0.134) 
Preparation x 'DIVERGENCE' -0.137 -0.107 -0.0218 -0.0522 
 (0.211) (0.220) (0.0520) (0.181) 
Supervision 1.032*** 1.019*** 0.260*** 1.039*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0838) (0.0246) (0.108) 
Supervision x 'DIVERGENCE' 0.325** 0.349** 0.111** 0.335** 
 (0.152) (0.159) (0.0422) (0.162) 
Dummy ‘DIVERGENCE’ = 1 -0.568 -0.606 -0.246* -1.248 
 (0.671) (0.759) (0.145) (0.901) 
Ln GDP pc, initial 0.119* 0.0958 0.0167 0.0652 
 (0.0627) (0.0594) (0.0166) (0.0945) 
Duration leader in office, initial -0.0127** -0.0143*** -0.00336** -0.0133** 
 (0.00531) (0.00552) (0.00159) (0.00676) 
CPIA, initial 0.298*** 0.302*** 0.0685*** 0.257*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0674) (0.0156) (0.0729) 
Dummy IDA = 1 0.240* 0.206* 0.0451 -0.00269 
 (0.123) (0.117) (0.0369) (0.176) 
Dummy Investment proj. = 1 0.403*** 0.366** 0.0828** 0.219 
 (0.142) (0.154) (0.0384) (0.190) 
Duration of project -0.0468** -0.0489* -0.0117* -0.0924*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0250) (0.00603) (0.0286) 
Constant -6.956*** -6.775*** -1.100*** -6.111*** 
 (0.568) (0.558) (0.145) (0.905) 
     
Observations 2023 2023 2023 1187 
Log-likelihood -873.9 -857.1  -509.1 
R2   0.337  
Countries 102 102 102 52 
Sector dummies N Y Y Y 
Sector x DIVERGENCE dummies N Y Y Y 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0(1)     
Joint significance (2)      
Supervision & Sup. x DIVERGENCE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Preparation & Prep. x DIVERGENCE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) 
chi2 statistics, p-value in parentheses. (2) p-values.  
Columns (1) and (2) estimated with probit. Column (3) estimated with OLS.  
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TABLE 3. Correcting for the endogeneity of preparation and supervision. 
 First-step - OLS OLS Probit OLS Probit 
Dependent variable Supervision Preparation Success Success  Success  Success 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Supervision predicted   0.746* 1.949 0.739* 1.993* 
   (0.400) (1.221) (0.381) (1.128) 
Supervision predicted x LICUS   0.421 1.242 0.445** 1.087* 
   (0.431) (1.227) (0.188) (0.605) 
Preparation predicted   0.284 1.259 0.291 1.207 
   (0.534) (1.694) (0.519) (1.573) 
Preparation predicted x LICUS   0.0400 -0.268   
   (0.643) (1.794)   
Dummy = 1 for LICUS -0.0854** -0.0739* -1.243 -2.580 -1.198** -2.883* 
 (0.0408) (0.0375) (0.888) (2.590) (0.515) (1.650) 
Dummy IDA = 1 -0.00358 -0.0218 0.0565* 0.180** 0.0567* 0.178** 
 (0.0324) (0.0374) (0.0306) (0.0901) (0.0297) (0.0897) 
Dummy Investment project = 1 -0.0703* 0.0374 0.128** 0.370** 0.128** 0.371** 
 (0.0422) (0.0505) (0.0565) (0.175) (0.0549) (0.171) 
Duration of project -0.0459*** -0.0427*** 0.0157 0.0457 0.0156 0.0463 
 (0.00709) (0.00753) (0.0100) (0.0327) (0.0108) (0.0327) 
Ln GDP pc, initial -0.0196 0.00542 0.0193 0.0526 0.0192 0.0531 
 (0.0209) (0.0253) (0.0196) (0.0596) (0.0190) (0.0570) 
Duration of leader in office, initial -0.00412*** 0.000223 -0.000944 -0.00388 -0.000961 -0.00377 
 (0.00146) (0.00153) (0.00196) (0.00586) (0.00195) (0.00564) 
CPIA, initial 0.00801 0.0500 0.0551* 0.161* 0.0551* 0.161* 
 (0.0270) (0.0303) (0.0291) (0.0956) (0.0301) (0.0927) 
Constant 3.230*** 2.759*** -2.727*** -9.999*** -2.728*** -9.984*** 
 (0.160) (0.210) (0.510) (1.636) (0.532) (1.651) 
Sum of total budget of five main donors weighted by of distance 0.0490** 0.0564*     
(0.0231) (0.0291)     
Sum of total budget of five main donors weighted by same language -1.937*** -1.226***     
(0.411) (0.420)     
Sum of total budget of five main donors weighted by same religion -0.277 -0.0703     
(0.347) (0.377)     
Observations 2023 2023 2023 2023 2023 2023 
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Partial R-squared / R-squared 0.063 0.049 0.077  0.077  
F-test 9.00 4.35     
Joint significance (p-values)                                      Sup & Sup x LICUS   0.0468 0.0777 0.0027 0.0201 
Prep & Prep x LICUS   0.8542 0.7581   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Col (1) and (2): Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Col (3)-(6): Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses. Note: the Sargan over-identification test for the second step after the first step presented in columns (1) and (2) has a p-value of 0.20.   
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TABLE 4. Correcting for the endogeneity: multivariate probit estimations. 
 
 
Dependent variable Success Supervision Superv. x LICUS Preparation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Supervision 1.769***    
 (0.185)    
Supervision x LICUS 0.329**    
 (0.167)    
Preparation 1.144***    
 (0.125)    
Dummy = 1 for LICUS -0.288** -0.0763 6.685*** -0.142 
 (0.144) (0.114) (0.192) (0.104) 
Dummy IDA = 1 0.247** -0.00849 0.0536 -0.0609 
 (0.0983) (0.0927) (0.0917) (0.129) 
Dummy Investment project = 1 0.346** -0.111 0.200 0.174 
 (0.135) (0.115) (0.165) (0.125) 
Duration of project -0.0216 -0.109*** -0.133*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0172) (0.0288) (0.0209) 
Ln GDP pc, initial 0.134*** -0.0797 -0.105 -0.0164 
 (0.0515) (0.0561) (0.0909) (0.0740) 
Duration of leader in office, initial -0.0102** -0.0113*** -0.00993 -0.000257 
 (0.00434) (0.00434) (0.00921) (0.00489) 
CPIA, initial 0.269*** 0.0424 0.124 0.0839 
 (0.0593) (0.0671) (0.114) (0.0801) 
Constant -3.604*** 1.789*** -5.331*** 0.820 
 (0.444) (0.455) (0.847) (0.601) 
Sum of total budget of five main 
donors weighted by distance 
 0.135** 0.204** 0.191*** 
 (0.0640) (0.102) (0.0615) 
Sum of total budget of five main 
donors weighted by same language 
 -5.207*** -5.938*** -3.283*** 
 (1.042) (1.141) (1.187) 
Sum of total budget of five main 
donors weighted by same religion 
 -1.117 -2.423** -0.757 
 (1.022) (1.229) (0.955) 
     
Observations 2023    
Countries 102    
Log-Likelihood 3033.5    
Probability that all   = 0 0.0000    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses. Supervision and 
Preparation are transformed into binary variables (see Appendix 2). By construction, Supervision x LICUS 
is also a binary variable. 
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TABLE 5. Quality of supervision in LICUS and non-LICUS countries.  
 
In % of rated projects 
Divergent interests 
(LICUS) 
Non-divergent interests 
Highly satisfactory 3 6 
Satisfactory 68 72 
Unsatisfactory 27 21 
Highly unsatisfactory 2 1 
 100 100 
Not rated (in % of total) 37 23 
Source: IEG, authors’ calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6. Supervision as a function of project characteristics and dummy LICUS 
 
Supervision (1) (2) (3) 
    
Dummy LICUS -0.229*** -0.193** -0.167* 
 (0.0805) (0.0844) (0.0940) 
Duration  -0.113*** -0.0986*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0151) 
Capacity = 1  0.217*** 0.214*** 
  (0.0670) (0.0661) 
IDA = 1   -0.0496 
   (0.0740) 
Investment = 1   -0.146 
   (0.103) 
NGO = 1   0.0664 
   (0.143) 
    
Observations 2023 2023 2023 
Ordered probit estimations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
1.a. Proofs of the results in Section II 
 
D’s problem can be written as 
 
 
 
where (2) denotes R’s incentive compatibility constraint. R’s optimal effort level is then 
given by 
 
such that D’s problem becomes 
 
(using 1)( E and 12 1)(  E ). 
The first-order conditions are then given by 
 
From (7), we get that2 
, 
which implies Proposition 1. Plugging (9) into (8), the following condition for optimal 
precision * is obtained: 
 
                                                 
2 We assume that   takes a value such that  1,0* a  and  1,0* b . In particular, this means that we 
require 

2
)1()1(2  c . 
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(It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied). 
To prove Proposition 2, plug (9) into (4) and take the expectation with respect to  , to 
obtain 
 
Likewise, ),(* V as defined in the text can easily be found and is given by 
 
From this, we obtain 
 
 
 
 
((16) holds because of the assumption that 

2
)1()1(2  c ; (17) holds as the 
expression attains its minimum at 1 , and its minimal value is given by 0
)1(2 2


.) 
Finally, Proposition 3 follows from standard comparative statics results (see for instance 
Athey, Milgrom and Roberts 1998). );(maxarg 

is non-increasing in   if and only if 
);();();( *  CV  has decreasing differences in );(  , which in this context 
means that .0
2*22





 CV  
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1.b. Two-dimensional contracts 
 
We will now briefly explore what happens if the contract proposed by D can contain a 
fixed component as well as a variable component (based on whether p=1); in other 
words, we allow for two-dimensional contracts and not just one-dimensional ones as in 
the main part of the paper. 
    Formally, D now proposes a contract ),
~,( bf , where f is a fixed payment that R 
receives as soon as accepting the contract (like (1-b)c in the main part of the paper), b~ is 
the ‘bonus’ he receives if p=1 (corresponding to bc in the main part), and  is precision. 
It is assumed that these two payments together must at least cover the cost of the project, 
c. 
As we did in the main part, we will assume that R’s participation constraint is satisfied, 
such that D’s problem can now be written as 
 
It is obvious that (21) must bind at the optimum, as otherwise it would be profitable for D 
to reduce f (which would increase her profit without affecting R’s effort decision). Thus, 
** ~bcf  . 
Solving for R’s optimal effort decision and substituting it into (19), we can then rewrite 
the problem as 
 
This is identical to (5) except that bcb ~ ; thus, 
)1(2
)21(~ **



 cbb , and all the 
other results remain the same. Note that *~b is independent of c, as R’s effort choice and 
D’s benefit from a successful project are both independent of c. 
Yet, there is a caveat to this analysis: the assumption that the recipient’s participation 
constraint is satisfied is no longer innocuous. R’s ex-ante expected utility from a contract 
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),~,( bf  equals 

  

 4
)~( 2bEf , which must be bigger or equal to R’s outside option 
(which we assumed to equal zero) to induce participation. However, with the optimal contract 
derived above, 
)1(2
)21(~**



 cbcf  could be negative for small c, which could in 
turn lead to a negative expected utility for some parameter values and thus to a rejection of the 
contract. Thus, the equivalents of Proposition 1-3 remain valid without further assumptions only 
if ).(cc   As ex-ante expected utility increases in  , the lowest threshold value is )0(c , 
which can be shown to equal 

 





8
211
)1(2
)21(
. 
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APPENDIX 2. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
 
Success of the project:  
Defined according to the ‘Outcome’ variable which assesses the extent to which the 
project’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, 
efficiently (Source: IEG). Outcome is assessed on a 6-point scale: highly satisfactory (6), 
satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory and highly 
unsatisfactory (1). ‘Success’ is a dummy variable equal to one for the three highest 
ratings of outcome and zero otherwise. 
 
Preparation:  
This variable assesses the government / implementing agency performance in the 
preparation of the project. It considers specifically whether the government / 
implementing agency took account of economic, financial, technical, policy, and resource 
considerations, and ensured participation of major stakeholders in preparing the project 
(Source: IEG). It is rated on a 4-point scale: highly satisfactory (4), satisfactory, 
unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory (1). When this variable is transformed into a binary 
variable, it is equal to one when preparation is highly satisfactory and satisfactory, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Supervision: 
This variable assesses the extent to which services provided by the World Bank supported 
implementation through appropriate supervision (Source: IEG). Two kinds of factors are 
considered to assess supervision. The first set of factors focus on development impact 
(timely identification of problems, appropriateness of solutions, effectiveness of World 
Bank supervision actions), while the second set of factors refers to the adequacy of 
supervision inputs and processes (adequacy of supervision resources, reporting quality, 
attention to fiduciary aspects). Each factor is rated as follows: (i) high (Bank performed 
all supervision actions with no shortcomings); (ii) substantial (Bank performed 
supervision actions generally well but with some shortcomings); (iii) modest (Bank 
supervision had major shortcomings); negligible (Bank largely failed to perform 
supervision). Overall supervision is rated on a 4-points scale: highly satisfactory (the 
project was rated at least ‘substantial’ on all factors, and ‘high’ on some), satisfactory 
(the project was rated at least ‘substantial’ on most factors), unsatisfactory (the project 
was rated less than ‘substantial’ on most factors), highly unsatisfactory (the project was 
rated ‘negligible’ on most factors). When this variable is transformed into a binary 
variable, it is equal to one when supervision is highly satisfactory and satisfactory, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
IDA: is a dummy variable equal to one if the project is financed by IDA and zero if it is 
financed by IBRD (Source: IEG).  
 
Investment: Dummy variable referring to the type of lending instrument. Lending 
instruments can be either ‘investment’ (dummy equals one) or ‘adjustment’ (dummy 
equals zero) (Source: IEG).  
 
Duration: duration of the project. This variable corresponds to the duration between the 
starting date of the project (signature) and the original closing date of the project (Source: 
IEG).  
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GDP pc: Logarithm of initial GDP per capita (in constant dollars) (Source: WDI, 2004).  
 
Duration leader in office: Number of years the national leader had been in office. ‘0’ 
indicates transition year. Source: Gurr, Harff and Marshall (“State Failure Task Force”, 
2003) and Bienen and van de Walle (“Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the 
Modern World”, 1991, Center of International Studies, Princeton University). 
 
CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. It has 16 equally weighted 
components, divided into four categories (6-point scale): (1) Macroeconomic 
management and sustainability of reforms; (2) Structural policies for sustainable and 
equitable growth; (3) Policies for social inclusion; (4) Public sector management. The 
initial value of the CPIA is introduced (starting year of the project). Source: World Bank. 
 
LICUS countries: Dummy equals to one when the CPIA (averaged over the duration of 
the project) is less than 3 and when the country was a LIC for at least one year during the 
project (Source: World Bank).   
 
APPRAISAL dummy: This dummy is equal to one when the first sub-component of the 
PIMI indicator is below the median of the sample. The first subcomponent - 
APPRAISAL (Strategic Guidance and Project Appraisal) - is assessed on the grounds of: 
- Nature of strategic guidance and availability of sector strategies; 
- Transparency of appraisal standards; 
- Observed conduct of ex ante appraisals; 
- Independent review of appraisals conducted. 
Source: Dabla-Norris et al. (2011) 
 
 
Instruments for supervision and preparation - Distance and supply-side variables: 
 
Same language as donor i : dummy taking the value of one if the donor country and the 
recipient country share a common language [from Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo (2004), 
source: CIA factbook (2003)]. 
 
Same religion as donor i : dummy variable taking the value of one if 30 percent or more 
of the population belong to one religious group in the donor as well as in the recipient 
country [from Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo (2004), source : Barrett (1982)]. 
 
Distance from capitals: it is measured as the distance in kilometres between the capitals 
of the recipients and Washington D.C., Tokyo and Brussels [Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 
(2004), source: data made available by the World Bank] 
 
Total aid budget of donor i: total net disbursements of ODA by donors i, in constant 
prices 2001 (i = France, Germany, Japan, UK, USA) (Source: OECD). 
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i Dollar and Svensson (2000) use regional dummies, per capita income and population as well as some 
project financial characteristics such as the number of conditions or loan size to instrument for preparation 
and supervision. Kilby (2000) tries to circumvent the issue of endogeneity by examining the relationship 
between supervision in a given year and the subsequent intermediate measure of project performance. 
Kilby (2012) constructs a predicted duration of project preparation using a stochastic frontier model and 
geopolitical variables (votes at the UN, military aid, UN Security Council non-permanent member) as 
sources of exogenous variation for the duration of preparation. Our instrumentation strategy is close to 
Kilby (2012) in that we use the geographical and cultural proximity of donors and recipient as proxies for 
the relative importance of recipients for the five main donors (see Tavares, 2003). We then weight the aid 
budget of the five main donors by these proximity variables. The objective of this identification strategy is 
to avoid using recipient or project characteristics as instruments, since those are unlikely to be exogenous to 
the success of aid projects. 
ii Unlike them, we only consider a one-shot setting; thus, reputational contracts (which are the focus of their 
paper) are ruled out. 
iii It may be natural to wonder how much the results in this section depend on the apparently artificial 
restriction to a one-dimensional space of contracts. This question is addressed in Appendix 1b). 
iv This is related to Besley and Ghatak (2005), where   measures the extent to which a worker identifies 
with the mission of the organization he works for. 
v This is the assumption usually made in ‘traditional’ principal-agent theory. 
vi His ex-ante utility (before he has observed  ), relevant for the participation decision, is 
))1((
2*** abcacbaE   . As it is assumed that his outside option (what he gets if he rejects the 
project proposal) is 0, it is however easy to show that his participation constraint is always satisfied, such 
that his ex-ante utility plays no role. 
vii Unfortunately the list of countries considered as 'Difficult Partnerships' by the OECD is not available.  
viii Since the actual implementation phase is potentially endogenous to performance, we use the closing date 
for the project that was anticipated at the time of the presentation of the project for approval by the Board 
of the World Bank. 
ix When income and the CPIA are dropped from the regression the direct effect of the dummy variable for 
divergent interests is highly significant and negative.  
x In terms of the model of Section II, the issue concerns the cross-derivative of Pr(success) with respect to 
project preparation and  . Let better preparation increase the value of the successful project, v. We then 
find that the optimal b increases in v, as does Pr(success), and 

v
success)Pr(2 >0. Thus, preparation is 
predicted to have a higher marginal positive impact on the likelihood of project success the more congruent 
are the interests of D and R. 
xi Overall, regression 1 of Table 2 has a good predictive power: out of the 2023 observations, only 19.4% 
are wrongly predicted for a cut-off point equal to 0.5. 
xii When we introduce only the sector dummies, the results are very similar to those obtained with sector 
dummies and their interaction with LICUS. 
xiii The sample of projects/countries is divided by two when we use the APPRAISAL dummy. We ran the 
regression of column 2 on this restricted sample and the results are unchanged. 
xiv It is worth noting that estimating the first-step using an ordered probit yields very similar results. 
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xv As we instrument two variables, we need three instruments to compute the Sargan test for over-
identification (p=0.20). Therefore, even though one of the instruments is not individually significant, we 
keep it as instrument in the first stage. 
xvi We also estimated the first-steps of Table 3 using ordered probit and the results are very similar to those 
obtained using OLS. 
xvii Unfortunately, we do not have enough identifying variables to estimate the model with a fifth equation 
for Preparation x LICUS. 
